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The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis states that there is an in-
verted U-shaped relationship between environmental degradation and the level
of income. Starting with Grossman and Krueger (1993) this pattern has been
intensively debated in empirical terms; recent reviews are provided by Dasgupta
et al. (2002) and Stern (2004). The EKC has also captured considerable at-
tention from policymakers and theorists. This is due to the fact that the EKC
hypothesis implies that pollution diminishes once a critical threshold level of
income is reached. As a consequence, there is the hope that { loosely speaking
{ the environmental problem sooner or later peters out as the economy grows.
There are two major strands within the theoretical EKC literature. In
the ¯rst class of models an EKC arises from shifts in the use of production
technologies, which di®er in their pollution intensity (Stokey, 1998; Smulders
and Bretschger, 2000). The second class focuses on the characteristics of the
abatement technology (John and Pecchenino, 1994; Selden and Song, 1995;
Andreoni and Levinson, 2001; Chimeli and Braden, 2002; Brock and Taylor,
2004).
The Andreoni and Levinson (2001) (thereafter AL) model has attracted a
signi¯cant attention. Using a static setup, they show that an EKC can be
explained with increasing returns to scale (IRS) in the abatement technology.
Moreover, AL claim that by focusing on the degree of returns to scale in abate-
ment, a large part of the literature dealing with very di®erent mechanisms (e.g.
a shift in technology or a shift in institutions) can be summarised.
The level of income at which pollution peaks (labelled \the turning point")
and the associated level of pollution are of fundamental interest from the per-
spective of public policy. A sound understanding of the pollution-income re-
lation (PIR) could provide important information for public policies aimed at
a reduction of the environmental burden. The empirical EKC literature has
accordingly devoted much e®ort to the determination of this critical threshold.
The results show, however, a large dispersion across di®erent studies. For in-
stance, the reported turning points for sulphur dioxide range from $2,900 to
$908,200 and for nitrogen oxides from $5,500 to $30,800 (in 1985 PPP$; Lieb,
2003). Given these diverse empirical results, it is clearly desirable to better un-
derstand the determinants of the turning point from a theoretical perspective.
In this paper, we set up a simple dynamic EKC model, which has the fol-
lowing characteristics: Pollution is a by-product of consumption activities, it
is modelled as °ow pollution and it creates disutility. Households can spend
resources on abatement to reduce net pollution. Following AL we assume that
there are IRS in abatement giving rise to an EKC. There are two market dis-
tortions due to external e®ects associated with consumption and abatement
activities. Permanent growth results from an accumulable stock of capital and
a linear ¯nal-output technology.
The paper at hand focuses on two issues: First, we employ the simple
dynamic EKC model to better understand the determinants of the turning
point. The factors which are of major interest in this type of models are the
preference for a clean environment, the degree of IRS in abatement and the
1magnitude of external e®ects. Second, we investigate the e®ectiveness of public
policy measures aimed at a reduction of the environmental burden. In this
context, it is important to have a model with multiple market failures so that the
question of the relative e®ectiveness of di®erent environmental policy measures
can be answered.
As noted above, pollution is modelled as °ow pollution. The reason lies
in the fact that an EKC is more likely to arise for °ow pollutants than for
stock pollutants. This is best illustrated by Lieb (2004, p. 484) who reports
that \almost all studies agree that there is an EKC for sulphur dioxide (SO2),
suspended particulate matter (SPM), oxides of nitrogen (NOx), carbon monox-
ide (CO), and for some (but not all) sorts of river pollution (PR)... Although
all these pollutants are stock pollutants, they all have short life-times and can
therefore be considered as °ow pollutants from a long-run point of view."
Turning to the related literature, there are a number of theoretical papers on
the EKC which consider the determinants of the turning point; some of these
papers also investigate the role of public policies. Brock and Taylor (2004)
use an augmented Solow model to demonstrate that an EKC arises along the
transition to the steady state. Although there is polluting production in this
model, there is no market failure. Lieb (2004) uses an overlapping generations
model with a stock pollution and a °ow pollution. He focuses on the di®erent
pollution paths of the stock and the °ow pollution. The model captures several
external e®ects associated with production and abatement. However, only the
problem of a myopic government is analysed implying that the intragenerational
externalities are internalised, while the intergenerational externalities are not.
Moreover, the e®ectiveness of public policy measures is not considered since the
unregulated market economy is not investigated. Chimeli and Braden (2002)
employ a simple endogenous growth model with environmental quality. The
authors show that environmental quality follows a V-shaped pattern, thereby
explaining an EKC for a stock pollution. There is single external e®ect associ-
ated with polluting production. Hence, the consequences of multiple external
e®ects cannot be studied. Finally, Anderson and Cavendish (2001) employ
a dynamic simulation model to investigate the consequences of public policy
measures on the turning point. This computable equilibrium model has the
advantage of being able to directly include di®erent aspects of the real world
which are important in this context. However, general equilibrium feedback
e®ects are excluded and optimal taxes cannot be derived.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, the basic
AL model is sketched. In Section 3, a simple dynamic EKC model is set up in
general form. The decentralised and the centralised solution are investigated
and the optimal tax scheme is determined. In Section 4, a parameterised ver-
sion of the model is employed to investigate the determinants of the turning
point and the relative e®ectiveness of di®erent public policies. In Section 5, it is
shown that an N-shaped PIR can potentially be explained from the interaction
of public policy and the intrinsic properties of the model. Section 6 demon-
strates concisely that the model is compatible with most sets of stylised facts
on economic growth and the environment. Finally, Section 7 summarises the
main results and concludes.
22 The Andreoni and Levinson EKC model
In an important paper, AL (2001) set up a simple static model to derive suf-
¯cient conditions for an EKC. The AL model is sketched below to provide a
reference point for the following discussion.
Utility of the representative agent depends positively on consumption C and
negatively on pollution P. The general utility function may be expressed as:
U = U(C;P). (1)
Pollution is a function of consumption and environmental e®ort E according
to:
P = C ¡ B(C;E). (2)
Pollution increases one-to-one with consumption (gross pollution) as repre-
sented by the ¯rst term on the RHS. On the other hand, pollution decreases
due to abatement as represented by the second term of the RHS. B(C;E) is the
abatement technology, which is increasing in both arguments. Both \inputs"
are essential for abatement, i.e. B(0;E) = B(C;0) = 0. The ¯nal basic equa-
tion is a standard budget constraint given by M = C + E, where M denotes
the available resources (income).
AL show that there are two conditions which together guarantee the exis-
tence of an EKC (AL, 2001, p. 277). The ¯rst condition { related to preferences
{ states that \the marginal willingness to pay to clean up the last speck of pol-
lution does not go to zero as income approaches in¯nity". This is a rather weak
condition; it is easily satis¯ed since pollution abatement can be regarded as a
normal good.1 The second condition { related to the abatement technology {
states that there must be IRS in abatement.
Using the following parameterisation U(C;P) = C ¡ zP with z = 1 and
B(C;E) = C®E¯, AL show that an EKC results provided that ®+¯ > 1. This














The preceding equation results from P = C ¡ C®E¯, C¤ = ®
®+¯M and E¤ =
¯
®+¯M, where C¤ and E¤ are the optimal level of consumption and environ-
mental e®ort. Equation (3) implies that P(M) is concave in M provided that
®+¯ > 1. Hence, IRS in abatement (de¯ned by ®+¯ > 1) represent a necessary
condition for the existence of an EKC.
3 A general dynamic EKC model
In this section, we set up a simple dynamic EKC model, which will be employed
in the course of this paper. Pollution results as a by-product of consumption
1Lieb (2002) shows that the normality of environmental quality is a necessary condition
for the existence of an EKC.
3activities and is modelled as °ow pollution. Households can reduce pollution by
spending resources on abatement. The abatement technology is characterised
by IRS. As AL (2001) have shown, this assumption leads to an EKC. There is
a homogeneous ¯nal-output good which is produced under constant returns to
scale using (physical and human) capital as the sole input factor. Households
earn income by renting capital to ¯rms. Output and factor markets are perfectly
competitive. We consider two types of externalities and hence the decentralised
solution diverges from the centralised solution. At ¯rst, the market economy
is considered and subsequently the centralised solution is investigated. Finally,
the optimal tax scheme is determined.2
3.1 The decentralised economy
There is a large number of identical households ordered on the interval [0;1].
The representative household derives utility from consumption C and disutility
from net pollution P. The instantaneous utility function is U(C;P) with UC >
0; UCC < 0; UP < 0 and UPP < 0.3 The °ow of pollution (per period of
time) is given by the di®erence between gross pollution G(C; ¹ C) and abatement
B(C;E; ¹ E):
P(C; ¹ C;E; ¹ E) = G(C; ¹ C) ¡ B(C;E; ¹ E), (4)
where E is environmental e®ort and a \bar" above a variable denotes its eco-
nomywide average. The above-stated pollution function shows that pollution is
modelled to result from consumption.4 Direct examples for polluting consump-
tion activities would be the use of automobiles and central heating. Turning to
environmental e®ort, we can interpret the model in the sense that both house-
holds as well as ¯rms conduct abatement. It is plausible and convenient to
let the incidence of abatement costs fall on households. To clarify this aspect,
consider a real-world example: Abatement in the case of driving automobiles
comprises the installation of catalytic converters and strainers. Although the
major part of this abatement activity (development and installation) is con-
ducted by ¯rms, households face the decision for, and bear the costs of this
environmental e®ort.
There are two kinds of externalities: First, polluting consumption is only
partially taken into account by the representative household, i.e. there is a
(negative) pollution externality. Second, environmental e®ort aimed at reducing
(net) pollution a®ects also the society as a whole, i.e. there is a (positive)
externality resulting from environmental e®ort. As an example, consider again
the use of automobiles. It is the household who bears the ¯nancial burden
but it is society that primarily bene¯ts from the implementation of catalytic
converters and strainers. External e®ects are associated with the economywide
2There are other general growth models with pollution and external e®ects (e.g. Smulders
and Gradus, 1996).
3We do not restrict the cross derivatives at this stage.
4More frequently, pollution is modelled as a by-product of production (e.g. Xepapadeas,
2004). There are, however, other theoretical studies, beside AL (2001), which assume that
consumption generates pollution (e.g. John and Pecchenino, 1994).
4averages of consumption ¹ C and environmental e®ort ¹ E, which are considered
as exogenous from the perspective of the typical household.
As noted above, households earn capital income only. Let r denote the
rental price of capital and K the stock of capital owned by households. Then
the household's income is simply rK. The household's gross expenditures (in-
cluding taxes) are given by (1 + ¿C)C + (1 + ¿E)E, where ¿C and ¿E represent
taxes (or subsidies) on consumption and environmental e®ort.5 Overall tax
revenues T are redistributed in a lump-sum manner according to a balanced-
budget rule, i.e. T = ¿CC + ¿EE. Households are assumed to maximise the
present value of an in¯nite utility stream. The associated dynamic problem






s:t: P(C; ¹ C;E; ¹ E) = G(C; ¹ C) ¡ B(C;E; ¹ E) (6)
_ K = rK ¡ (1 + ¿C)C ¡ (1 + ¿E)E + T (7)
K(0) = K0, (8)
where ½ denotes the time preference rate, t the time index, _ K the rate of change
of K per period of time and K0 is the initial stock of capital, respectively. Notice
that equation (7) shows the °ow budget constraint of the typical household.
As mentioned above, the focus here is on °ow pollution. Because a pure
°ow pollution (i.e. there is no pollution stock) cannot become negative, the
technical restriction P ¸ 0 must be taken into account (see also Lieb, 2004, p.
488). Moreover, since we are interested in an inverted U-shaped PIR, attention
is restricted to interior solutions. The dynamic problem above can be easily
extended to allow for border solutions with P = 0.
The (current-value) Hamiltonian for the above-stated problem reads as fol-
lows:
H = U[C;P(C; ¹ C;E; ¹ E)] + ¸[rK ¡ (1 + ¿C)C ¡ (1 + ¿E)E + T], (9)
where ¸ denotes the shadow price of capital. The necessary ¯rst-order condi-







_ ¸ = ¡¸(r ¡ ½); (12)
where Ux and Px denote the partial derivatives of U and P with respect to
x 2 fC;Eg, respectively. For ease of interpretation, assume for the moment
5Optimal tax rates are determined below.
6In addition, the transversality condition limt!1 e
¡½t¸K = 0 must hold. Moreover, we
assume that the necessary conditions are also su±cient for a maximum of the utility functional.
5that ¿C = ¿E = 0. Equation (10) then shows that along the optimal growth
path the (private) marginal utility of consumption must equal the shadow price
of capital ¸. The marginal utility of consumption comprises two components:
(i) the direct utility from consumption UC and (ii) the disutility from pollution
UPPC. Moreover, it should be remembered that PC captures a gross pollution
e®ect GC and an abatement e®ect BC. Similarly, equation (11) indicates that
marginal utility from environmental e®ort UPPE must equal the shadow price of
capital. Equation (12) shows that if the growth condition holds (i.e. r¡½ > 0),
the shadow price of capital vanishes at the rate r ¡ ½.
Turning to the ¯rm side of the economy, there is a large number of ¯nal-
output ¯rms. The representative ¯nal-output ¯rm produces a homogeneous
good using capital as the sole input factor.7 The constant returns to scale
technology is Y = AK, where Y is ¯nal output, K the stock of capital and A
a constant technology parameter. Capital depreciates at constant rate ± > 0.
From the solution to the ¯rm's static optimisation problem one gets:
r = A ¡ ±:
3.2 The centralised economy
The social planner maximises the welfare of the representative individual. This
requires, of course, that the external e®ects are taken into account. The social
planner's problem may be expressed as follows:
max




s:t: P(C; ¹ C;E; ¹ E) = G(C; ¹ C) ¡ B(C;E; ¹ E) (14)
_ K = F(K) ¡ ±K ¡ C ¡ E (15)
K(0) = K0. (16)
The (current-value) Hamiltonian reads as follows:
H = U[C;P(C; ¹ C;E; ¹ E)] + ¸[F(K) ¡ ±K ¡ C ¡ E] (17)
and the necessary ¯rst-order conditions are given by:8
UC + UP(PC + P ¹ C) = ¸ (18)
UP(PE + P ¹ E) = ¸ (19)
_ ¸ = ¡¸(FK ¡ ± ¡ ½). (20)
Comparing the ¯rst-order conditions (18) and (19) to the ¯rst-order conditions
(10) and (11) shows the di®erences between the centralised solution and the
decentralised solution. When deciding on the optimal levels of C and E the
7As noted above, capital should be interpreted broadly to comprise human as well as
physical capital.
8Once again, the transversality condition limt!1 e
¡½t¸K = 0 must hold and we assume
that the necessary conditions are also su±cient.
6social planner, in contrast to the private agent, takes the external consequences
associated with average consumption ¹ C and average environmental e®ort ¹ E into
account. Speci¯cally, the social planner considers also the e®ects of average
consumption on gross pollution (UPP ¹ C = UPG ¹ C) as well as the consequences
of average environmental e®ort on abatement (UPP ¹ E = ¡UPB ¹ E).
3.3 Optimal tax scheme
Optimal taxes ¿¤
C and ¿¤
E result from the comparison between the ¯rst-order
conditions of the social planner's solution [(18) and (19)] and the ¯rst-order
conditions of the decentralised solution [(10) and (11)]. It can be readily shown









PE + P ¹ E
< 0: (22)
Let us start with the interpretation of ¿¤
E, which is straightforward. Equation
(22) shows that the optimal subsidy on environmental e®ort equals the ratio of
the external marginal e®ect of environmental e®ort on pollution P ¹ E < 0 and
the overall (i.e. private and external) marginal e®ect of environmental e®ort on
pollution PE+P ¹ E < 0. Similarly, the optimal consumption tax ¿¤
C is the ratio of
the external marginal consumption e®ect on utility UPP ¹ C < 0 and the overall
marginal e®ect of consumption on utility given by UC + UP(PC + P ¹ C) > 0.9
Consider ¯nally the consequences of a tax on consumption ¿C > 0 on the
decisions of the representative household. A consumption tax ¿C > 0 reduces
the LHS of equation (10). Holding the shadow price of capital constant, equa-
tion (10) then requires that the marginal utility of consumption must increase.
This can be accomplished by reducing the level of consumption. An analogous
interpretation (with ¿E < 0) applies to equation (11).
4 A speci¯c dynamic EKC model
In this section, a parameterised version of the model is employed to investigate
the determinants of the turning point and the e®ectiveness of public policy. At
¯rst, we consider the centralised solution with z = 1. Subsequently, we turn to
the more relevant case of an unregulated / imperfectly regulated economy with
z < 1.
4.1 Parameterisation
For further investigations we parameterise instantaneous utility U(C;P), gross
pollution G(C; ¹ C) and abatement B(C;E; ¹ E). The following functional forms
are assumed:
U(C;P) = log(C ¡ zP) with z > 0, C ¸ zP (23)
9Notice that UC + UP(PC + P ¹ C) = ¸ > 0.
7G(C; ¹ C) = CÁ ¹ C! with 0 < Á;!;< 1 (24)
B(C;E; ¹ E) = C®E¯ ¹ E´ with 0 < ®;¯;´ < 1, (25)
where z re°ects the desire for a clean environment. A lower value of z means
that a given amount of pollution causes less disutility and individuals will ac-
cordingly spend more on consumption and less on environmental e®ort. Turning
to the gross pollution function (24), CÁ represents the internal e®ect of con-
sumption on gross pollution and ¹ C! is the corresponding external e®ect. We
assume throughout the paper that ! + Á = 1, which implies a linear gross
pollution function.10 Similarly, E¯ is the private and ¹ E´ the external e®ect of
environmental e®ort in abatement.11
A short explanation of the instantaneous utility function (23) is indicated.
Since Á + ! = 1 and taking into account C = ¹ C and E = ¹ E, pollution is given
by P = C ¡ C®E¯+´. Moreover, assuming z = 1 the utility function becomes
U[C;P(C;E)] = log(C®E¯+´). This formulation has the advantage that C and
E enter utility additively separable, which enables an analytical solution for the
social planner's problem. Two issues should be noticed in this respect: First,
the preceding utility function requires C ¡ zP ¸ 0, otherwise utility would
not be de¯ned. For z · 1 this restriction is automatically satis¯ed since C
is gross pollution and P is net pollution (gross pollution minus abatement).
Second, the utility function implies UCP = 1
(C¡zP)2 > 0. This property appears
counterintuitive at ¯rst glance. However, this is due to the fact that a rise
in P has the same e®ect as a reduction in C and hence marginal utility of
consumption increases with pollution P.12
4.2 Analytical results
The PIR is derived analytically and determinants of the turning point are dis-
cussed. Here we focus on the centralised solution and assume that z = 1. This
allows us to derive analytical results. The decentralised solution with z < 1 is
investigated in a second step by simulating the transition process (Section 4.3).
4.2.1 The time path of pollution P(t) and the PIR P(Y )
From the ¯rst-order conditions [(18) to (20)] and the parameterised functions
[(23) to (25)], one obtains the following solutions for K and ¸:
K = K0e(A¡±¡½)t (26)
¸ =
® + ¯ + ´
K0½
e¡(A¡±¡½)t: (27)
10In addition, this restriction enables us to solve the di®erential equation system resulting
from the centralised solution analytically.
11An appendix available upon request shows that the parameterised Hamiltonian functions
are concave, i.e. the necessary conditions are also su±cient for a maximum of the utility
functional.
12According to Michel and Rotillon (1995) UCP > 0 can be interpreted as a compensation
e®ect.
8Using equations (18), (19) and (27) and noting equations (23) to (25), one can
formulate an analytical expression for the time path of pollution:
P(t) =
K0e(A¡±¡½)t®½









® + ¯ + ´
!¯+´3
5: (28)
Furthermore, the PIR may be expressed as follows:
P(Y ) = cY ¡ (cY )®(hY )¯+´, (29)
where c := C
Y is the consumption rate and h := E
Y the \environmental e®ort
rate". To determine c and h, we consider the growth rate of capital ^ K :=
_ K
K
using equations (15), (25) and (26):







Together with the parameterised versions of (18) and (19) this immediately
yields the balanced growth values of c and h to read as follows:
c =
®½
A(® + ¯ + ´)
and h =
(¯ + ´)½
A(® + ¯ + ´)
: (31)
The PIR is illustrated in Figure 1 (a) and the time path of pollution in
Figure 1 (b). These ¯gures are based on the baseline set of parameters, which
is set out in Section 4.3.1 below. As in AL (2001), IRS in abatement is a nec-
essary condition for a hump-shaped PIR.13 Figure 1 (a) shows that pollution















Figure 1: P(Y ) and P(t) with IRS in abatement (® + ¯ + ´ > 1)
¯rst rises with income, then declines and eventually becomes zero. This EKC
represents a balanced growth phenomenon.14 Although pollution does not grow
13In a more general version of the AL (2001) model Plassmann and Khanna (2004, p.
16) show that \for non-constant returns to scale in gross pollution, a su±cient condition for
pollution to decline is rather that the returns to scale in abatement exceed the returns to scale
in gross pollution."
14Employing a neoclassical growth model, it can be shown that the EKC can also result
from transitional dynamics.
9at a constant rate (as is required by the de¯nition of a balanced growth path),
the illustrated pollution path represents a balanced growth phenomenon since
pollution results from two endogenous variables (consumption and environmen-
tal e®ort), which both grow at constant rates. The required time span until
pollution reaches its peak and becomes zero is quite long. The whole \EKC
story" takes nearly 250 years as is displayed in Figure 1 (b).
The EKC pattern displayed in Figure 1 (a) is in line with empirical evidence
as reported by Grossman and Krueger (1995) according to which the PIR is
asymmetric with an upper tail that declines relatively gradually.
4.2.2 The turning point
As has been noted above, the level of income at which pollution peaks and the
associated level of pollution is of outstanding interest from the perspective of
public policy. We employ the model set up above to investigate the factors which
determine this turning point. Unfortunately, closed-form solutions can only be
obtained for the centralised economy with z = 1. Under these restrictions we
can investigate the impact of basic technology and preference parameters on the
turning point analytically. This represents an interesting limiting case which is
relevant in the sense that the qualitative results largely hold true also for the
decentralised economy with z < 1. In Section 4.3 we turn to the empirically
more plausible case of an imperfectly regulated economy with z < 1.
First, consider the point in time at which pollution reaches its maximum.
From the analytical expression for the time path of pollution [equation (28)],




0 ®®¡1(¯ + ´)¯+´(® + ¯ + ´)2¡®¡¯¡´½®+¯+´¡1]
(® + ¯ + ´ ¡ 1)(A ¡ ± ¡ ½)
. (32)
It should be noticed that z, Á and ! do not appear on the RHS, which is due to
the restrictions imposed (i.e. z = 1 and Á + ! = 1). Below we will investigate
the impact of these parameters numerically. Inserting the preceding expression
for t¤ into the time path of income [Y (t) = AK(t)] and using equation (26)












This critical income level is determined by the marginal product of capital A,
the rate of time preference ½, the elasticity of consumption in abatement ®
as well as the elasticities of environmental e®ort in abatement ¯ and ´. It is
independent of the depreciation rate ± and the initial capital stock K0.
From the preceding solution for Y ¤ we obtain the comparative static results
shown in Table 1.16 The ¯rst row shows that Y ¤ increases with A. For ease
15This is basically the solution for the turning point one would obtain from the static AL
(2001) model.
16To simplify notation, we de¯ne ° = ® + ¯ + ´.
10Table 1: Comparative static results for Y ¤
@Y ¤
@x for x 2 fA;½;®;¯g
A Y ¤ 1
A > 0
½ Y ¤ ¡1
½ < 0
® Y ¤ (°¡1)(¡®+¯+´)+®°(log[°]+(¯+´)(log[¯+´]¡log[®])
®°(°¡1)2 ?
¯ Y ¤ 2+°(log[°]¡2)+°(®¡1)(log[®]¡log[¯+´])
°(°¡1)2 ?
of interpretation, let us assume that ® = ¯ + ´ such that C = E .17 In this
case, the level of pollution depends only on consumption. Since an increase in
A reduces the consumption rate [equation (31)], the required level of income
for pollution to reach its maximum increases. The second row indicates that
Y ¤ falls as ½ rises. An analogous reasoning is applicable here. The rate of
consumption rises with ½ [equation (31)] and hence the required level of income
for pollution to reach its maximum falls. The signs of the partial derivatives
of Y ¤ with respect to ® and ¯ are indetermined.18 In most instances, the
derivatives with respect to ® and ¯ are negative. An increase in the degree of
IRS in abatement leads, ceteris paribus, to a higher abatement output for each
level of income and hence to a lower turning point. However, a positive sign
can not be excluded in general; for instance, under the restrictions ® = ¯ + ´
and z = 1 the derivative with respect to ® is positive.19
4.3 Numerical analysis
The preceding analysis focused on the centralised solution with z = 1 imply-
ing that consumption and pollution have the same weight in the utility func-
tion. We now investigate the importance of external e®ects, the e®ectiveness
of public policies and the implications of di®erent environmental preferences.
To accomplish this task, the transition process of the model under study must
be simulated. We apply the backward integration procedure (e.g. Brunner and
Strulik, 2002) to solve for the time paths of the endogenous variables.
4.3.1 Calibration
Table 2 shows the baseline set of parameters which underlies the numerical
investigations. The time preference rate ½ and the depreciation rate ± are
similar to the parameter values used in previous exercises (e.g. Ortigueira and
17A similar reasoning would apply to the case ® 6= ¯ + ´.





19In this case, the relevant range of consumption is 0 < C < 1. Within this range an
increase in ® lowers, ceteris paribus, the abatement output. As a result, the maximum level of
pollution occurs at a higher C-level. With ® = ¯ + ´ the rate of consumption is independent
of ® and hence a higher C-level implies a higher Y
¤.
11Santos, 1997; Eicher and Turnovsky, 2001). Given these values A is chosen such
that the implied net rate of return on capital (A¡±) and the growth rate of per
capita income (A ¡ ± ¡ ½) are in line with empirically plausible numbers (6%
and 2%). The parameter ! determines the strength of the external pollution
e®ect of consumption, while ´ captures the external e®ect of environmental
e®ort in abatement. We choose ! and ´ such that the relative external e®ect
of consumption in (gross) pollution ( !
Á+!) and the relative external e®ect of
environmental e®ort in abatement (
´
¯+´) are both 10%, implying fairly moderate
external e®ects. As noted above, we assume that the gross pollution function
is linear (i.e. Á + ! = 1).20
Table 2: Baseline Set of Parameters
Final output technology A = 0:12 ; ± = 0:06
Preferences ½ = 0:04
Abatement technology ® = 0:6 ; ¯ = 0:45 ; ´ = 0:05
Gross pollution Á = 0:9 ; ! = 0:1
Turning to the abatement technology parameters (®, ¯ and ´), there are
two points to be noticed: First, we assume that there are IRS in abatement, i.e.
®+¯+´ > 1. As in AL (2001), IRS in abatement are necessary for an EKC. This
is in line with Xepapadeas (1994), where IRS in the pollution abatement sector
(due to knowledge spillovers) is a necessary condition for unbounded growth
without excess pollution (similar results are given in Michel 1993). Another way
to justify IRS in abatement is due to technological progress in the abatement
technology (Anderson and Cavendish, 2001). There is also empirical evidence
for the existence of IRS in pollution abatement. For instance, AL (2001, p.
281) argue that \at the level of US states, average pollution abatement costs
per dollar of GSP [gross state product] decline with industry size, across states
and industries, and over time." Moreover, Maradan and Vassiliev (2005) report
that the marginal opportunity costs of carbon dioxide abatement, measured as
forgone production of output, are negatively associated with income. Second,
the parameters ¯ and ´ crucially determine the ratio of abatement expenditures
and income. This ratio ranges from about 3% for z = 0:5 to 15% for z = 1.
These values are in line with the empirical ¯gures reported by Brock and Taylor
(2004, p. 6).
4.3.2 The turning point
The dependence of Y ¤ on the di®erent model parameters is investigated numer-
ically. On this occasion, we consider three di®erent values of z. In addition,
the unregulated economy (Table 3) is distinguished from an imperfectly regu-
20The alternatives of a concave or convex gross pollution function G(C) appear clearly less
plausible.
12lated economy (Table 4).21 We focus on these two cases since we believe that
the real world is best represented by an unregulated or imperfectly regulated
economy. The basic assumption here is that politicians know the optimal taxes
but due to imperfections in the political process do not fully implement this
optimal tax scheme. The numbers reported in Tables 3 and 4 show the elas-




Table 3: Elasticities of Y ¤ with respect to model parameters;
unregulated economy (µ = 0)
!
(Á + ! = 1) ´ A ½ ® ¯ z
Y ¤
z = 1 0.67 -0.79 0.97 -0.90 -4.41 -5.74 -4.70
Y ¤
z = 0:75 0.46 -1.45 0.98 -0.90 -7.48 -7.40 -4.42
Y ¤
z = 0:5 0.28 -2.22 0.99 -0.91 -9.06 -8.61 -4.19
Three points should be noticed: First, the case of z = 1 is qualitatively iden-
tical to the cases of z < 1. By lowering z, the results change only gradually.
Furthermore, the respective elasticities show the same sign for the unregulated
economy (Table 3) and for the imperfectly regulated economy (Table 4). Sec-
ond, the analytical results from Table 1 are con¯rmed and the ambiguous e®ects
of ® and ¯ are determined, at least numerically. Third, compared to the case
investigated above (centralised solution with z = 1) the impact of additional
model parameters (i.e. ! and ´) can now be assessed.
The ¯rst column of Table 3 shows the elasticity of Y ¤ with respect to !. At
the outset, it should be noticed that the restriction for the gross pollution func-
tion to be linear (Á+! = 1) remains valid, i.e. increasing ! requires a reduction
of Á. The positive impact of ! on Y ¤ can be explained as follows: Since Á+! is
held constant, the level of consumption resulting from the centralised solution
remains constant. Increasing ! leads to a larger gap between the centralised
and the decentralised allocation. This implies that decentralised consumption
rises, which, holding other things constant, causes a higher level of pollution at
each level of income. Graphically speaking, the EKC is expanded outwards and
the turning point increases. Moreover, this column also shows that the impact
of ! on Y ¤ increases with z. A higher value of z (i.e. greener preferences) leads
to a larger gap between the centralised and the decentralised solution, as can be
21The tax rates imposed are speci¯ed as ¿C = µC¿
¤




C > 0 and
¿
¤
E < 0 are optimal taxes (de¯ned in Section 3.3); µC ¸ 0 and µE ¸ 0 indicate the ex-
tent of tax implementation. A policy programme which diminishes both market distortions
simultaneously is described by µ = µC = µE.
22The elasticities are based on an 10% increase of the parameter under consideration.
13seen by inspecting the ¯rst-order condition (18). This implies that the strength
of the mechanism described above is reinforced. Finally, the e®ect of ! on Y ¤
is smaller for the imperfectly regulated economy (Table 4).
Table 4: Elasticities of Y ¤ with respect to model parameters;
imperfectly regulated economy (µ = 0:5)
!
(Á + ! = 1) ´ A ½ ® ¯ z
Y ¤
z = 1 0.30 -0.75 0.99 -0.90 -2.71 -4.87 -4.98
Y ¤
z = 0:75 0.21 -1.46 1.00 -0.91 -6.92 -7.00 -4.60
Y ¤
z = 0:5 0.14 -2.27 1.00 -0.91 -8.90 -8.43 -4.29
The second column of Table 3 gives the impact of a variation in ´ on Y ¤,
which is negative. An increase in ´ has two separate e®ects: First, environ-
mental e®ort falls. To understand this e®ect, consider the case of a variation
in ´ assuming that ¯ + ´ = constant: This implies that E resulting from the
centralised solution remains constant. Since the magnitude of the distortion
increases, the gap between the centralised and the decentralised solution gets
larger. Hence, E must decrease implying that pollution rises at each level of
income and that the turning point increases as well. Second, by holding ¯ ¯xed
(which is assumed in Table 3 and 4), an increase in ´ leads to a higher degree of
IRS, which means that pollution at each level of income falls. This implies that
the turning point decreases. The second e®ect dominates the ¯rst and hence
the sign of this elasticity is negative.23
The third column (A) and the fourth column (½) are in line with the analyt-
ical results obtained from the special case investigated in Section 4.2. The ¯fth
column (®) and sixth (¯) column contain negative values. Increasing either ® or
¯ increases the degree of IRS in abatement, which has a strong negative impact
on the turning point.24 Finally, the last column (z) shows that an increase in
z has a substantially negative impact on Y ¤. This observation is in line with
Figure 2 below.
4.3.3 The e®ectiveness of public policies
The e®ectiveness of public policies aimed at a reduction of the environmen-
tal burden is investigated. On this occasion, we distinguish between the case
of highly environmentally sensitive preferences (z = 1) and the case of less
environmentally sensitive preferences (z = 0:5).
23The results are nearly identical for the unregulated and the imperfectly regulated economy.
This is due to the fact that the IRS argument does not depend on the degree of regulation.
24As for the analytical solution the impact of ± is zero.
14The baseline set of parameters implies fairly moderate external e®ects, i.e.
the relative external e®ect of consumption in gross pollution ( !
Á+!) and the
relative external e®ect of environmental e®ort in abatement (
´
¯+´) are both
10%. Nevertheless, the impact of the associated market failures on the PIR
is substantial, as illustrated in Figure 2. The PIR labelled \social" shows the
EKC resulting from the centralised solution, while the PIR labelled \market"
shows the EKC resulting from the unregulated market economy (ignore the
curves marked by µC = 1 and µE = 1 for the moment). Moreover, Figure 2
(a) is based on z = 1, while Figure 2 (b) assumes z = 0:5. In both cases,
Y ¤ and the maximum amount of pollution P¤ = P(Y ¤) are highly sensitive
with respect to external e®ects, i.e. the market economy shows considerably
higher values for Y ¤ and P¤ compared to the centralised solution. This implies
that public policy should be highly e®ective with respect to a reduction of the
environmental burden.





























Figure 2: Centralised EKC versus decentralised EKC
By imposing appropriate taxes on consumption and subsidies on environ-
mental e®ort the government can correct the market failures. The taxes im-
posed are speci¯ed as ¿C = µC¿¤
C and ¿E = µE¿¤
E, where ¿¤
C > 0 and ¿¤
E < 0 are
optimal taxes (determined in Section 3.3) and µC ¸ 0 and µE ¸ 0 indicate the
extent of tax implementation.
Figure 2 illustrates the e®ectiveness of the policy instruments under con-
sideration. The curves labelled as µC = 1 implies that the external e®ect of
polluting consumption is completely internalised, whereas the external e®ect of
environmental e®ort is not. The curves labelled as µE = 1 shows the reverse sit-
uation, i.e. the external e®ect of environmental e®ort is completely internalised
and the external e®ect of consumption on gross pollution is not.
We now turn to the relative e®ectiveness of public policy measures. Fig-
ure 2 (a) shows that the consumption tax is more e®ective than a subsidy on
environmental e®ort provided that preferences are extremely environmentally
sensitive (z = 1). This can be recognised by the fact that the curve µC = 1
lies strictly below the curve µE = 1 implying both a lower Y ¤ and P¤. In con-
trast, provided that preferences are less environmentally sensitive (z = 0:5) the
reverse holds true. A subsidy on environmental e®ort is more e®ective than a
tax on polluting consumption.
15The reason for this observation is as follows: The optimal taxes shown in
equations (21) and (22), which are Pigouvian taxes, indicate the importance
of the respective market failure. The optimal environmental e®ort subsidy is
independent of z. In contrast, the optimal consumption tax depends on z. This













Holding C and E ¯xed we see that the optimal consumption tax ¿¤
C increases
with z. For z approaching zero, the representative individual does not care
about pollution and hence polluting consumption does not represent a prob-
lem. The greener the preferences become (the larger z), the more important
is this market failure.25 For large values of z we ¯nd that j¿¤
Cj > j¿¤
Ej, which
means that the market distortion resulting from polluting consumption is of
a higher magnitude than the market distortion associated with environmental
e®ort. Consequently, a consumption tax is more e®ective than a subsidy on
environmental e®ort. In contrast, provided that z is small enough the reverse
holds true, i.e. j¿¤
Cj < j¿¤
Ej. In this case, a subsidy on environmental e®ort is
more e®ective than a consumption tax.
5 N-shaped pollution-income relation
There are a number of empirical studies which argue that the PIR is not inverted
U-shaped but instead is N-shaped, at least for some pollutants (Grossman and
Krueger, 1995, Section IV; Lieb, 2003). This is important because, in this case,
pollution eventually increases with income.
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Figure 3: M-shaped PIR
25This argument is based on holding C and E ¯xed, which is problematic because optimal









Ej for z = 0:5 indeed holds at each point in time for the simulations underlying Figure
2.
16The model under study provides a potential explanation for this phenom-
enon. Imagine the economy develops at ¯rst along the upward sloping branch
of the EKC resulting from the market economy as shown in Figure 3. At
some point in time, policy instruments are implemented to internalise external
e®ects and pollution accordingly diminishes. In the model, the economy jumps
to the centralised EKC; of course, in reality this process is distributed over
time. Provided that the economy is still below the critical threshold Y ¤ of the
centralised solution, pollution starts to increase again. As a result, one would
observe an N-shaped PIR resulting from the interplay of public policy and the
intrinsic properties of the model. It should be noticed that this explanation
implies in fact an M-shaped PIR. As soon as the peak of pollution (on the
centralised EKC) is reached, pollution starts to decline again.
The mechanism sketched above provides one potential explanation for an
N-shaped PIR. We do not consider this to be a general explanation. How-
ever, future empirical research aimed at explaining this pattern should take
this possibility into account. This kind of reasoning implies that the ¯rst down-
ward movement is policy induced, i.e. it should succeed the implementation of
environmental regulations aimed at a reduction of pollution. The subsequent
increase in pollution is then simply due to the fact that growth might be ac-
companied by a rise in pollution. Moreover, an N-shaped pattern can result
provided that there are less than IRS in abatement. Finally, one should notice
that Giles and Mosk (2003) ¯nd indeed an M-shaped EKC pattern by using
long-run data on methane emissions for New Zealand.
6 Other empirical regularities
A dynamic EKC model should not only be able to reproduce an inverted U-
shaped PIR. In addition, it should be compatible with the remaining empirical
regularities on economic growth and the environment. These have been reported
by Brock and Taylor (2004) based on US data for the period 1950 to 2001:
First, the emission intensities (P=Y in our notation) for most pollutants are
declining over time. Second, despite the fact that emission intensities decline,
the emission levels (P in our notation) continue to increase for a certain period
of time. Third, abatement costs relative to GDP (E=Y in our notation) are
roughly constant.


























Figure 4: Pollution levels, pollution intensity and abatement expenditures
17The EKC model set up above is compatible with these empirical regularities.
Figure 4 (a) shows that the model is in line with the ¯rst and the second stylised
fact.26 The emission intensity (P=Y ) is indeed declining over time and the
pollution level (P) continues to increase for a certain period of time although
pollution intensity is falling. Figure 4 (b) indicates that the third regularity is
also satis¯ed, i.e. abatement expenditures relative to GDP (E=Y ) are indeed
constant over time.
In addition, the simple dynamic EKC model (being a standard AK growth
model with pollution) is compatible with most of the stylised facts on economic
growth, known as the Kaldor (1961) facts: (i) the growth rate of per capita
output is constant, (ii) the capital-output ratio is constant and (iii) the real
rate of return on capital is constant as well.27
7 Summary and conclusions
We have set up a simple dynamic EKC model with multiple market failures
resulting from external e®ects associated with polluting consumption and envi-
ronmental e®ort. The model has been used to investigate the determinants of
the level of income at which pollution starts to decline (turning point) as well
as the relative e®ectiveness of public policy measures aimed at a reduction of
the environmental burden. The main results can be summarised as follows:
(1) The turning point is most strongly a®ected by the degree of IRS in abate-
ment and the preference for a clean environment. In addition, the magnitude of
external e®ects associated with polluting consumption and environmental e®ort
also has a substantial impact. This aspect points directly to the importance of
public policy measures.
(2) Provided that households have a strong preference for a clean environ-
ment a consumption tax (i.e. avoiding the problem of pollution) is more e®ective
than a subsidy on environmental e®ort (i.e. correcting the problem of pollu-
tion). In contrast, if households are less environmental sensitive, then a subsidy
on environmental e®ort is more e®ective in comparison to a consumption tax.
(3) It has been shown that an N-shaped PIR, observable for some speci¯c
pollutants, can potentially be explained from the interaction of public policy
measures and the intrinsic properties of the model. Although we do not consider
this explanation to be valid in general, we think that this kind of reasoning
should be taken into account in future empirical research aimed at explaining
this pattern.
(4) In addition to the empirical EKC hypothesis, the dynamic EKC model
under study is compatible with the remaining empirical regularities associated
with economic growth and the environment. Moreover, the model is also com-
patible with most of the stylised facts on economic growth due to Kaldor (1961).
Finally, the paper points to a number of interesting questions for future
research. For instance, an obvious °aw of the AL model, which becomes es-
pecially obvious in a dynamic context, lies in the fact that pollution sooner or
26Figure 4 is based on the centralised solution with z = 1 and the baseline set of parameters.
27The model is silent on the constancy of the capital and labour income shares.
18later becomes negative as the economy grows provided that there are IRS in
abatement. Finding a plausible mechanism which is able to avoid this prob-
lematic implication would represent a valuable contribution to the theoretical
EKC discussion.
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